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“You know what you need at a crime scene? Soft eyes. You got 
soft eyes, you can see the whole thing. You got hard eyes, you 
staring at the same tree, missing the forest.”1 
Trained to see objects of perception as traces of an absent event, the detective remains 
a prototypical figure for practices of critical reading, particularly the “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” that have lately come under scrutiny.2 Critics have begun recently to 
question the continuing efficacy of the pervasive reliance on interpretive models that 
take meaning to be “hidden, repressed, deep, and in need of detection and disclosure.”3 
They point out that suspicion has become second nature to literary critics who only 
know how to approach the text as an illusion or secret to be “exposed.”4 Prizing 
detachment, distance, and abstraction, suspicious reading assumes a negative, even 
“adversarial” relation to the text that fails to make room for other, more affirmative 
responses, which might be equally valuable.5 Many advocates of moving beyond 
suspicious reading believe that its goals — critique and demystification — are no 
longer as politically efficacious as they once seemed.6 They claim that suspicion may 
have outlived its usefulness and needs at least to be supplemented, if not replaced 
altogether, by other forms of engagement.
Of the critiques briefly outlined above, perhaps the most compelling — and 
certainly the most wide-ranging — attempt to conceptualize an alternative to the 
“hermeneutics of suspicion” is “surface reading,” formulated by Stephen Best and 
Sharon Marcus in their introduction to a 2009 special issue of Representations. Best 
and Marcus note that the forms of suspicion and critique recently questioned by 
scholars such as Eve Sedgwick, Michael Warner, and Rita Felski, among others, 
are underwritten by a hermeneutic of depth that has remained a fundamental 
assumption of literary and cultural analysis since the 1970s. They argue that the 
most decisive and influential expression of this depth hermeneutic is the model of 
“symptomatic reading” Fredric Jameson theorized through an amalgam of Marxism 
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and psychoanalysis in The Political Unconscious (1981). Because symptomatic reading 
seeks a “latent meaning behind a manifest one” it proceeds on the assumption that 
“the most interesting aspect of a text is what it represses,” not its “literal meaning.”7 
They insist that in order to retrieve what has been lost through this pervasive focus on 
depth, readers should instead “attend to the surfaces of texts.” For Best and Marcus, 
symptomatic reading perpetuates a “heroic” vision of the critic’s role. By aligning 
reading with perception rather than interpretation, surface readers seek only the 
“minimal critical agency” that emerges from “attentiveness” to literal meaning and 
surface appearance through, for instance, “accurate” or “neutral” description of the 
text. “[W]hat lies in plain sight,” they argue, “is worthy of attention but often eludes 
observation — especially by deeply suspicious detectives who look past the surface 
in order to root out what is underneath it.”8 
Surface reading has tapped into an apparently widespread frustration with the 
long-standing critical neglect of what seems most apparent — and perhaps even most 
engaging or pleasurable — in literary and cultural objects. Indeed, many scholars 
sympathize with Best’s and Marcus’s feeling that a reductive, knee-jerk impulse 
toward demystification has become an overly familiar, even inert, critical gesture 
and that readers today need to engage in more varied ways with the objects they 
analyze. Despite an avowed methodological pluralism, however, Best’s and Marcus’s 
rejection of depth poses severe limitations to any mode of analysis — particularly 
Marxist analysis — that explores the agency of cultural production or critical practice 
by locating these activities within a socio-historical totality.9 Crystal Bartolovich and 
others have convincingly responded by pointing out that the commitment to this 
critical project remains absolutely vital today.10 
I support these defenses of suspicion and critique and agree that Best’s and 
Marcus’s analysis of symptomatic reading misses its target in crucial ways that need 
to be addressed.11 At the same time, the emergence of surface reading reveals a need 
not only to defend but to reimagine and extend these Marxist critical commitments 
through new models of reading. This is not only a question of employing specific 
methodologies or affirming particular political positions, though these are both 
important topics of discussion. It is necessary also to consider how we conceptualize 
the nature of both the textual object and the act of reading. The separation of surface 
and depth, attention and suspicion that generally has underpinned the debate over 
surface reading inhibits Marxist analysis. Instead of articulating “new” methods of 
reading, we need to think more carefully about the ontology of that which is read. 
Marxist criticism needs to produce conceptual models for reading that foreground 
the relation between surface and depth, cultural text and socio-historical totality. This 
effort is particularly important today, at a moment when a Marxist critical orientation 
is as relevant and necessary as ever, yet theoretical debate within the academy is 
increasingly pluralized and unmoored.
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Drawing on the ideas of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and the Marxist cultural theorist Raymond Williams, in this essay I put forward the 
concept of “soft eyes” in order to develop one such model of critical engagement. 
Exploring what he calls “the originality of depth,” Merleau-Ponty argues that the 
object of perception cannot be separated into “surface” and “depth” because in 
embodied experience they are interrelated.12 Depth provides the very thickness and 
texture that allow surfaces to be perceived. Though he likely never read Merleau-
Ponty, Williams grasps this phenomenological insight when he argues that totality 
should not be conceived of as an object of focus in itself. Rather, totality is the 
constitutive dimension of the act of reading. It makes reading possible because it 
includes both reader and text in a whole social and historical process. Marxism, then, 
is not neglectful of surface details at all. Its depth hermeneutic makes possible a form 
of acute perception that not only engages surface, but does so more fully than surface 
reading itself. Because “soft eyes” perceive the interrelation of “surface” and “depth,” 
they take in the critical relation to social totality on which Marxist criticism depends. 
“Soft eyes” thus offer one possibility for sustaining the values of critique and suspicion 
amid what Timothy Bewes has identified as the recent “decline of the symptom.”13
 My use of the phrase “soft eyes” aims to revise Best’s and Marcus’s characterization 
of critical readers as “suspicious detectives” who neglect the text’s surface. I take the 
phrase from a scene in the television series The Wire in which the veteran Baltimore 
homicide detective Bunk Moreland trains a rookie detective, Kima Greggs, to work 
a murder scene. Later in the season, Kima returns to the crime scene and locates a 
crucial piece of evidence by following Bunk’s advice: “You got soft eyes, you can see 
the whole thing. You got hard eyes, you staring at the same tree, missing the forest.”14 
Kima finds this piece of evidence (a bullet) not by surveying the crime scene from the 
outside, but physically entering and inhabiting it. She imitates physical movements 
the suspects might have made, tracks minute and seemingly random details, and 
follows out multiple lines of sight. From this active and embodied perspective, she 
ultimately locates the bullet, which she cannot see directly because it is lodged inside 
a block of wood. 
So what kind of reader is Kima? Clearly, she is not fixated only on the “hard” and 
immediate surfaces of objects. Yet she also does not merely ignore the surface to 
“plumb hidden depths.”15 I want to suggest that surface reading cannot account for 
Kima’s discovery because it is predicated on a fundamental separation of surface from 
depth. Kima’s discovery is only possible because depth is not, as Best and Marcus 
assume, a separate space located “behind” the object’s surface. Since perception is a 
bodily process that takes place in a whole, three-dimensional world, even surfaces 
have depths that cannot be seen, yet still can be accessed. By inhabiting the constitutive 
three-dimensionality of space and any perceivable object in it, Kima recognizes that 
depth is what makes surfaces available for perception in the first place. Thus she does 
not venture “behind” or “beneath” the surface. Rather, she sees into surfaces, in order 
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to access the depths of surface itself. Her success shows that “suspicious detectives” 
don’t neglect the surface for hidden depths, but work “softly” through depth to engage 
surface more fully. 
The Originality of Depth
The notion that successful reading requires “soft eyes” means that despite the 
limitations of surface reading, Best’s and Marcus’s turn to the category of perception 
in order to reconceptualize the act of reading can be surprisingly useful — just not 
in the way they intend. In order to correct the bias towards hermeneutic depth and 
redirect readers to what is immediately available, given, and manifest, surface reading 
replaces interpretation with perception. Many of the responses to surface reading 
have highlighted the preference for attentive description over critical interpretation, 
but none have considered the particular model of perception that makes possible this 
recourse to surface description in the first place. While Best and Marcus clearly define 
their concept of surface, they don’t address the model of perception that underpins it: 
[W]e take surface to mean what is evident, perceptible, apprehensible in 
texts; what is neither hidden nor hiding; what, in the geometrical sense, 
has length and breadth but no thickness, and therefore covers no depth. 
A surface is what insists on being looked at rather than what we must 
train ourselves to see through.16 
Perception, here, describes a primarily passive encounter with immediate physical 
appearance. The object of perception is flat: it has “length and breadth but no thickness.” 
By construing the perceived object to be a concrete, two-dimensional presence fully 
visible to the perceiving subject, Marcus and Best present surface in such a way as to 
make the engagement with depth (through interpretation) unnecessary. Completely 
lacking depth, the object can be said to have a “literal meaning” that can be mimetically 
represented simply through an “accurate” description.17 This concept of perception 
renders the object mere surface while relegating depth to a space separate from 
(beyond, or behind) the object.
Perception, however, may not be so wedded to the surface of things as all of this 
suggests. In fact, phenomenology offers an alternative to this naturalized, “objective” 
understanding of perception as akin to a photographic reproduction.18 Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty argues, is an embodied activity: not a detached representation of 
the world but a fully immersed, three-dimensional mode of bodily engagement. In 
order to see anything at all, one must be physically “situated” in a whole spatio-
temporal environment composed of innumerable points of view.19 One never sees an 
object from all sides at once, but only from a particular point of orientation within 
the same world. There is always a hidden aspect of the object, e.g., its back side. 
From the traditional, objective perspective, this is a merely contingent product of 
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one’s limited point of view. These visual gaps are simply absences that one’s brain 
unconsciously fills in, for instance by imagining another viewpoint on the object. But 
Merleau-Ponty argues that these absences retain a concrete and productive presence 
within the field of vision. What one sees depends on what cannot be seen. “We must 
recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon,” Merleau-Ponty writes: “there 
occurs here an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or other, and, to take the 
extreme case, what is behind my back [or the back side of the object] is not without 
some element of visual presence.”20 As Francisco Varela explains, phenomenology 
rejects a fundamental assumption of the traditional, objective worldview: “the sort 
of determinateness one finds in physical objects must not be assumed a priori to be 
applicable to perceptual experience.”21 
The incompletion that defines Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of 
perception entails an alternative understanding of surface and depth from that 
presented by Best and Marcus. The opacity of perception is a direct result of the fact 
that, because the eye (indeed the perceiving subject as a whole) is part of the field of 
vision, depth is an essential, structural condition of perception. Best’s and Marcus’s 
pure, flat surface — “with length and breadth but no thickness,” immediately available 
to perceptual “attentiveness” — is an idealized abstraction that can only exist in 
thought. By contrast, phenomenology recognizes that because perception takes 
place in three-dimensional, lived space rather than in some ideal, objective space, 
any perceivable surface is both immediately present and, at the same time, latent, 
mysterious. Embodied perception, Merleau-Ponty argues, is always “thickened” by 
the negativity of these “indeterminate presences,” the aspects of the object that cannot 
be seen, but have a presence in the perceptual field.22 The irreducible “thickness” of 
surface is what Merleau-Ponty calls the “originality of depth.”23 Depth differs from 
the “geometrical” dimensions of length and breadth highlighted by Best and Marcus, 
which simply define objective position in space. For Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, 
depth does not refer to location in space: it is the fundamental, structural property 
of space itself.24 Though depth can be measured like length and breadth, unlike these 
other dimensions it performs a more essential function, one not captured by objective 
measurement: depth constitutes the world as a “thickened” social space that subjects 
inhabit and explore but can never exhaust. 
By recognizing the “originality of depth,” phenomenology discloses the “indissoluble 
link between things and myself ” that makes perception possible, revealing the viewer 
to be actively “involved” in the world rather than a detached observer.25 Depth is a 
consequence of the fact that one does not experience the world from the outside, 
but only from within it. Yet the “originality” of depth means that neither subject nor 
object are simply “in” the world: in fact, each is part of it. Depth is therefore the source 
of that “tacit sense of belonging” that comes with one’s inhabitation of a whole lived 
world that includes innumerable points of view.26 It is what characterizes perceptual 
experience as not only embodied but also social and historical.27 Because it takes 
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place in depth, for Merleau-Ponty perception is more than the mere presentation 
of a discrete object to an isolated subject: it opens the subject to a whole social and 
historical world — a totality — on which subject, object and the act of perception all 
depend. Properly understood as a spatial dimension, depth thus marks the presence 
of social totality as the medium through which both subjects and objects (readers 
and texts) are actively constituted.28 Surface reading loses sight of totality as this 
constitutive dimension of reading because Best and Marcus rely on a naturalized, 
objective model of perception in which the immediacy of surface is abstracted out 
from a depth that remains mere background. Therefore, though Best and Marcus 
assert that surface reading is “not antithetical to critique,” their separation of surface 
from depth — the separation of the text from the social totality that constitutes it 
— erodes any basis upon which social critique could be sustained.29 By contrast, 
the phenomenological approach that underpins my concept of “soft eyes” offers an 
alternative model in which surface and depth are mutually intertwined.
Though Best and Marcus derive their concept of surface and depth from Jameson’s 
symptomatic reading, Jameson’s work also includes this phenomenological concept of 
depth articulated by Merleau-Ponty. Returning to Jameson’s definition of the “political 
unconscious” with this phenomenological emphasis in mind, it becomes apparent 
that he collapses these two incommensurable models of the text. As Jameson explains: 
“the literary structure, far from being completely realized on any one of its levels, tilts 
powerfully into the underside of impensé or non-dit, in short, into the very political 
unconscious, of the text.”30 However, the “underside” of an object is not a separate 
“level” of a structure: an object with sides and a multi-leveled structure imply two 
different models of surface and depth. A multi-leveled structure — a more familiar 
critical conception of the textual object — implies the separation of surface from 
depth. This allows for the possibility of a surface reading, in which the surface of 
the text becomes a distinct object of focus from the social totality that lurks “behind” 
it.31 However, by contrast, locating the text’s political unconscious on the “underside” 
of the object emphasizes the “originality of depth,” the constitutive interrelation 
between surface and depth that emerges in perceptual experience. The “underside” 
of the object is the aspect of the object that is necessarily hidden from view because 
perception always takes place from a particular point of orientation in a whole, “thick” 
three-dimensional environment. Rather than a simple absence hidden beneath a 
surface presence, the “underside” of the object has an “indeterminate presence” in 
the field of vision. Thus, instead of separating the object into distinct levels, surface 
and depth remain intertwined, as they are in lived experience.  
“Soft eyes” engage depth as this constitutive dimension of the object, rather than 
as mere background, or a separate level of a structure. Let’s recall that Kima finds 
the bullet inside a block of wood. Objects have front and back sides, and therefore 
an inside, only because depth is the constitutive dimension of space, rather than a 
separate object or position (a “level”) located in space. Therefore, it would be wrong to 
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say that in locating the bullet, Kima ventures “beyond,” “behind,” or even “through” 
the surface to locate the bullet “hidden” “beneath” it. Rather, the object’s surface is 
inextricable from its depth. Surface reading cannot access this space because Best 
and Marcus understand surface as purely flat (without sides, surface has inside, no 
depth). Kima’s “soft eyes” see that depth is not the hidden background of surface 
appearance but the constitutive dimension — depth — of surface itself.
Kima’s success suggests that totality is best understood not as a distinct level of 
reality on which the reader can focus — and ultimately map, as Jameson has put it 
— but the spatial dimension that constitutes the object itself. “Soft eyes” recognize 
that depth makes the surface of the text available to apprehension (reading) in the 
first place. I take this to be the force of Marxist conceptions of totality, including 
Jameson’s. Successful detection, the reconstruction or unfolding of a text’s meaning 
and significance depends on an awareness of totality (“the ability to see the whole 
thing”), the larger whole through which surface takes on presence and meaning. 
Surface reading forecloses this awareness through its separation of surface and depth. 
Rather than moving beyond surface details into a detached and epistemologically 
secure critical “metalanguage,” “soft eyes” grasp these details as pieces connected 
within a larger, structured whole that determines the limitations and possibilities 
of any critical reading.32 
Learning to See
As far as I know, Raymond Williams never encountered Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
perception. Nevertheless, Williams develops a concept of socio-historical totality 
that carries through the implications of a phenomenology of perceptual depth. Like 
Merleau-Ponty, Williams recognized the active, embodied, and fundamentally social 
nature of perception: “each of one us,” he pointed out, “has to learn to see.”33 Williams 
argued that perception does not record objective data but actively constitutes the 
object through a complex negotiation that involves the evolution of the human 
organism together with the individual’s previous perceptual experiences and the social 
codes (the rules of interpretation) one has already learned. Without the interpretive 
structures provided by actually lived social relationships — the “depth” immanent 
to perception — one cannot register the “literal meaning” of the immediately given 
surface of things; one would simply be blind.34 There is no such thing, for Williams 
or for Merleau-Ponty, as a straightforward or literal descriptive account. Description 
already includes both interpretation and creative production; it partially creates the 
reality it “describes” because description depends on the immersion of both subject 
and object in a whole social process.
Williams’s insight that even the most basic and seemingly subjective experience of 
perception is an active social production, a process of communication and learning 
that involves a whole social world, had far-reaching consequences for the theory of 
cultural materialism he develops from the early 1960s through the late 1970s. Most 
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famously in his essay “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” Williams 
argues that Marxist cultural analysis has been perennially hampered by a problem of 
surface and depth: a dualistic and mechanistic separation of base and superstructure, 
production and reproduction, in which the cultural object is conceived separately 
from — and a mere “reflection” of — the more fundamental productive forces that 
organize social life.35 For Williams, writing in the 1970s, this dualist error is reinforced 
by formalist tendencies within contemporary Marxism, namely the importation of 
Althusser’s structuralist Marxism into the British intellectual Left. Williams regards 
structuralist Marxism as tending toward a treatment of social or superstructural 
depth as merely another level of reality, rather than a constitutive dimension — a 
whole social process — through which subject and object are related. From Williams’s 
perspective, then, the problem with “symptomatic reading” and the “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” becomes, pace Best and Marcus, not an excessive investment in social or 
historical depth but a reduction of depth simply to another level of surface. Surface 
reading then compounds this error by attempting to return to surface, which it 
imagines as separate from depth. In other words, inasmuch as both symptomatic 
and surface reading seek to differentiate and separate depth from surface rather 
than theorize their indissoluble connectivity, they both reinforce a dualism that 
separates the reader from the text and both from the world. No mode of attentiveness 
can bridge this gap.36 
For Williams, a phenomenological view of perception (though he did not call it 
that) works against this tendency towards dualism by dispensing with the concept of 
reflection altogether and revealing instead a whole, three-dimensional social process. 
As we saw, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology uncovers the totality that makes possible 
the seemingly punctual moment of perception. Williams’s cultural theory moves in the 
same direction. He wants critical analysis to unfold the social processes that constitute 
the text as an “object” in the first place. “[I]t is not the base and the superstructure that 
need to be studied,” Williams argues, “but specific and indissoluble real processes.”37 
This leads Williams to conceptualize the “object” of analysis as a historically situated 
practice. “Now I think the true crisis in cultural theory,” he states, “is between [the] 
view of the work of art as object and the alternative view of art as a practice.”38 
The concept of practices necessitates the idea of social totality. But totality here 
becomes immanent to a cultural product — a dimension of the object of analysis, 
not a separate plane of reality beyond it. Understanding totality in these terms 
depends on recognizing that depth is a constitutive dimension of the textual object: 
not its mere “background,” but something more like its “back side,” the part of the 
object that remains within one’s visual experience, even though it cannot be seen. For 
Williams, approaching cultural objects as historically situated practices captures this 
constitutive three-dimensionality: “what we are actively seeking is the true practice 
which has been alienated to an object, and the true conditions of practice…which have 
been alienated to components or mere background.”39 For Williams, as for Merleau-
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Ponty, in the act of reading/perception, the object loses its determination and the 
critic recognizes the totality that constitutes both the object and her relation to it.
Foreclosing the separation of surface from depth, Williams’s move from objects to 
practices locates agency within both the cultural text and critical reading. Reading, 
Williams has reminded us, is as “active as writing.”40 But he does not assign the critic 
a heroic autonomy or epistemological security above and beyond the text. This is 
why he insists that the move from objects to practices may not produce a coherent 
methodology — a specific “way we read,” as Best and Marcus put it.41 Williams argues 
that, by giving up the “built-in procedure” that comes out of identifying an object of 
analysis, critics can better grasp the relationality of all social practices — from simple 
perception to reading, writing, and political organization — within a structured social 
totality.42 Critical reading can by no means replace, nor can it be “equate[d]” with, 
political activism.43 But they are related practices: “the whole point of thinking in 
terms of totality,” Williams points out, “is the realization that we are part of it; that 
our own consciousness, our work, our methods, are then critically at stake.”44 
The idea of “soft eyes” aims to bring Williams’s recognition that totality means 
“we are part of it” into critical practice today. Williams’s statement necessitates 
that totality can be grasped not solely as an object seen from the outside, from an 
objective “bird’s eye view” — as a map, for instance. Rather, totality can also be 
grasped phenomenologically — from the inside, in other words — by unpacking 
the ways that it already necessarily limits and conditions one’s perspective. This 
phenomenological reorientation does not render the contingency of one’s position 
absolute, but works in the opposite direction, toward the recognition of the conditions 
under which all practices, all forms of agency and action are both limited and made 
possible. Rather than the result of the heroic act of critical reading — something the 
critic adds to or extracts from the text — totality is what makes reading possible in 
the first place. Totality puts our methods of reading in question, but in so doing it 
renders them significant. 
This allows us to imagine reading as a form of agency that is not limited to either 
of the options imagined by Best and Marcus: the “heroic” “freedom dream [of ] 
demystification” (symptomatic reading) or the “minimal critical agency” of mere 
“attentiveness” (surface reading).45 Best and Marcus assume that agency necessitates 
a heroic freedom from constraint that allows the symptomatic reader to reveal 
the totality lurking behind the text. When surface reading gives up this “freedom 
dream,” critical agency becomes attenuated. Yet, this logic presumes that agency is 
underwritten by a prior freedom from constraint. What if agency is not predicated 
on freedom, but rather is itself freedom’s precondition? Seeing totality through “soft 
eyes” does not privilege the critic’s heroic freedom, nor does it settle for a minimal 
agency. It uncovers the irreducible social and historical conditions that both limit and 
make possible the act of reading. “Soft eyes” affirm the agency of both critical reading 
and cultural production not on the basis of a putative freedom, but as a product of 
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location within a larger social and historical totality. 
“Soft eyes” would animate any reading driven by this recognition of totality as a 
process that constitutes — rather than simply constrains — the critical agency of 
reader or text. Yet I want to refrain here from suggesting that “soft eyes” entails a 
specific method of reading at all (i.e., “soft reading”). Instead, I would like the idea 
of “soft eyes” to remain something like a guiding principle based on the insight 
registered above: critical reading does not reveal totality as if from the outside but 
uses the concept of totality (“think[s] in terms of totality”) to grasp the limitations 
and possibilities of any reading of a text at a particular historical moment. We might 
productively locate useful tools or methods in any number of places, including in 
those critics working expressly within the tradition of suspicion and symptomatic 
reading as well as those working outside of it.
Not as method, then, “soft eyes” can serve instead to reorient the currently 
proliferating methods and modes of reading towards the horizon of totality that 
they often explicitly abjure. The question of how to respond to the increasing variety 
of reading practices that are currently laying claim to (or being claimed by) post-
critical, post-suspicious, or post-symptomatic approaches is crucial to contemporary 
Marxist criticism. As I noted earlier, surface reading has proven so influential at least 
in part because it embraces the expanding methodological pluralism of the present 
— the wide variety of methods and practices that constitute “the way we read now.”46 
Here, Williams’s point about giving up a “built-in procedure” for cultural analysis 
becomes significant. Certainly, one must defend precisely the value and complexity 
of the methods of symptomatic and suspicious reading that Best and Marcus critique. 
Yet it will also prove worthwhile to work on another front to channel the energies, 
methods, and insights of surface reading, and other emerging scholarly modes, in a 
more critical direction.47 
Thus, I have undertaken here to show that surface cannot be separated from — or 
conceived without — depth. Merleau-Ponty and Williams both remind us that to focus 
on surface in isolation would not make us “attentive” readers, but simply blind. What we 
see with “soft eyes” is the central place of totality to any act of reading. Marxist thought 
and criticism will remain a depth hermeneutic. But as such, Marxism is actually the 
best means of engaging surface most fully. I would suggest that surface readers like 
Best and Marcus take Bruno Latour’s often-cited call to move “closer” to objects of 
study less literally.48 As new modes of post-symptomatic reading increasingly look to 
take up questions of significance and attachment — what Latour has called “matters 
of concern,” rather than “matters of fact” — it becomes increasingly important to 
insist that this is not best accomplished by the pursuit of immediacy, the “hard eyes” 
that look ever more closely at the surface. It is only possible “to see more clearly” by 
learning to read with “soft eyes” that can grasp the complex, dynamic, and structured 
social totality through which reader and text are related.49 Reading needs to come 
closer to the insights of Marxist analysis, not farther away. 
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